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INTRODUCTION
Everybody, at one point or another, needs medication; not ev-
erybody, however, can afford it. With this fact in mind, in 1992,
Congress enacted the 340B drug pricing program,1 a statutory
scheme designed to reduce pharmaceutical costs for safety-net
medical providers2 and the indigent populations they serve. Under
340B, pharmaceutical manufacturers are required to offer dis-
counts on certain medications to participating safety-net providers.
In theory, the 340B program helps to alleviate part of the financial
burden shouldered by medical providers serving indigent popula-
tions and creates a low-cost source of pharmaceutical medication for
the indigent patients themselves.
Yet despite its intended benefits, the 340B program has proved
to be less of a success than Congress originally hoped. To be sure, in
the decades since its enactment, 340B has grown significantly. In
2015 alone, branded 340B sales in the United States at wholesale
acquisition cost3 are estimated to total over $15 billion, 5 percent of
1. Pub. L. No. 102-585, 106 Stat. 4943 (1992) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 256b
(2015)). There is no hidden significance to the name of the program; “340B” merely denotes
the section of the Public Health Service Act in which the program appears.
2. For the purposes of this Note, safety-net providers are healthcare providers that “have
demonstrated a commitment to provide care to low-income persons, to those with special
needs, and to other vulnerable populations regardless of their ability to pay.” Darrell J.
Gaskin & Jack Hadley, Population Characteristics of Markets of Safety-Net and Non-Safety-
Net Hospitals, 76 J. URB. HEALTH 351, 352 (1999). To that end, safety-net providers “are
distinguished by the volume of care they provide to vulnerable populations,” and “[a] rel-
atively high percentage of the patients of safety-net hospitals have low incomes or have
conditions ... that require special medical services.” Id.
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-3a(c)(6)(B) (2015) (defining “wholesale acquisition cost” as “the
manufacturer’s list price for the drug or biological to wholesalers or direct purchasers in the
United States, not including prompt pay or other discounts, rebates or reductions in price, for
the most recent month for which the information is available”).
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all outpatient drug sales in the United States.4 Total 340B expendi-
tures are expected to reach $25 billion by 2019.5 
The program’s size, however, is not so much an issue as is its
focus. Some analysts have questioned 340B’s integrity and purpose,
as safety-net hospitals may profit significantly from their partici-
pation in the program.6 For example, suppose Hospital A qualifies
for the 340B program and thus receives a significant discount on
certain medications because of its status as a safety-net hospital.
Under 340B, rather than pass these discounts on to its indigent
patients in the form of lower prices for care, Hospital A may charge
its patients full price for the drugs and pocket the difference. In
this way, some safety-net hospitals have profited over $100 million
per year.7 Although many safety-net providers undoubtedly need the
proceeds, the question left unanswered is whether the indigent pa-
tients, for whom the 340B program was arguably created, are
receiving any benefit.
Experts familiar with the 340B program recognize this problem,
among others.8 In early 2014, the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) and the Health Resources and Services Adminis-
tration (HRSA), the agency tasked with overseeing the 340B pro-
gram, considered issuing a “mega rule” to resolve the program’s
internal conflicts and clarify points of dispute.9 In the summer of
2014, however, a network of pharmaceutical manufacturers and ad-
vocacy groups successfully challenged HRSA’s authority to publish
4. AARON VANDERVELDE, BRG HEALTHCARE, MEASURING THE RELATIVE SIZE OF THE 340B
PROGRAM 3 (2015), http://www.thinkbrg.com/media/publication/606_Vandervelde_340B_
Whitepaper_20150526.pdf [http://perma.cc/E3BU-756P]. This figure has risen significantly
from $6 billion in 2011. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-836, MANUFACTURER
DISCOUNTS IN THE 340B PROGRAM OFFER BENEFITS, BUT FEDERAL OVERSIGHT NEEDS
IMPROVEMENT 2 (2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/323702.pdf [http://perma.cc/MGD3-
DS7W] [hereinafter GAO 2011 REPORT].
5. VANDERVELDE, supra note 4, at 3. Earlier reports had estimated that 340B totals
would reach $12 billion in 2016. See, e.g., BIOTECH. INDUS. ORG., THE 340B DRUG DISCOUNT
PROGRAM: A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE 340B PROGRAM 14 (2013), http://www.bio.org/sites/
default/files/340B%20White%20Paper%20FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/5NXE-ZABR] [herein-
after BIOTECH]. The 340B program has clearly outpaced those earlier predictions by a
significant margin. See infra Part I.B for more information on the program’s trending growth.
6. See infra Part II.A.2.
7. See infra Part II.A.2.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra note 73.
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legislative rules on 340B, ultimately leaving HRSA on shaky ground
to issue any substantive regulations.10 HRSA scrapped the “mega
rule” in November 2014,11 instead publishing proposed “Omnibus
Guidance” in the Federal Register on August 28, 2015.12 Agency
guidance, however, no matter how significant, is not sufficient to fix
340B.
A better solution is to rethink the current form of the 340B
program. Simply put, 340B needs to be restructured if it is to fulfill
the purpose for which it was originally intended. To date, neither
Congress, nor the pharmaceutical industry, nor the expansive net-
work of safety-net medical providers has put forth a realistic plan
to comprehensively revise the 340B program. This Note seeks to fill
that gap. First, this Note proposes a practical framework for revis-
ing 340B to best serve indigent patients, while simultaneously
alleviating financial burdens on drug manufacturers and safety-net
providers. Second, this Note seeks to spur practical and creative
discussion and debate among the various interested parties engaged
in the 340B program. The proposal outlined herein may provide a
foundation for such discussion and, eventually, reform.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the history of
340B—its intended purpose, enactment, and implementation—as
well as the program’s current scope and trending growth. Part II
evaluates many of the significant problems in the current scheme,
which fall broadly into two categories: immediate and fundamental.
Contributing to the former category are the insufficient guidance
regarding what constitutes a “patient” under 340B13 and the grow-
ing speculation and criticism over hospitals profiting millions of
dollars through 340B discounts.14 The latter category, though,
speaks more to issues at the heart of the program: HHS’s lack of
authority to properly administer 340B—illustrated through the
litigation over the “orphan drug exception”15—and the countervail-
ing interests between drug manufacturers and safety-net providers
10. See infra Part II.B.1.a.
11. See infra note 73.
12. See 340B Drug Pricing Program Omnibus Guidance, 80 Fed. Reg. 52,300 (proposed
Aug. 28, 2015).
13. See infra Part II.A.1.
14. See infra Part II.A.2.
15. See infra Part II.B.1.
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over the purpose of the 340B program and the distribution of the
340B discounts.16 Part III lays out a practical framework for re-
vising the 340B program: first, unlinking 340B from Medicaid;17
second, creating new standards for patient eligibility and require-
ments for covered entities;18 and finally, granting HHS the proper
authority to ensure effective implementation of the new changes
and oversee the administration of the 340B program.19
I. THE 340B CONTEXT
A. The History of 340B
In 1992, Congress enacted the 340B drug discount program under
the Veterans Health Care Act of 199220—codified as Section 340B of
the Public Health Service Act21—to help certain safety-net medical
service providers “stretch scarce Federal resources as far as pos-
sible, reaching more eligible patients and providing more compre-
hensive services.”22 
Congress originally intended the 340B program to correct an
unforeseen consequence of the 1990 Medicaid Drug Rebate Program
(MDRP), “which required drug manufacturers to offer Medicaid
discounts [in the form of rebates to state Medicaid agencies] on out-
patient drugs that would at least match the ‘best price’ offered to
any other buyer.”23 Prior to the MDRP, drug manufacturers had
voluntarily offered large discounts to Department of Veterans Af-
fairs (VA) hospitals and other safety-net medical providers serving
uninsured and indigent populations.24 Under the MDRP, however,
drug manufacturers were forced to extend rebates to Medicaid
16. See infra Part II.B.2.
17. See infra Part III.A.1.
18. See infra Part III.A.2.
19. See infra Part III.A.3.
20. Pub. L. No. 102-585, § 340B, 106 Stat. 4943, 4967-71 (1992).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 256b (2015).
22. H.R. REP. NO. 102-384 (II), at 12 (1992); see also ANDREW W. MULCAHY ET AL., RAND
CORP., THE 340B PRESCRIPTION DRUG DISCOUNT PROGRAM: ORIGINS, IMPLEMENTATION, AND
POST-REFORM FUTURE 1 (2014), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/
PE100/PE121/RAND_PE121.pdf [http://perma.cc/EAM8-4ZWU].
23. MULCAHY ET AL., supra note 22, at 5; see also S. REP. NO. 102-259, at 6 (1992).
24. See MULCAHY ET AL., supra note 22, at 5; see also BIOTECH, supra note 5, at 6-7.
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“disproportionate share hospitals” (DSHs)25 and patients, and man-
ufacturers consequently limited discounts to VA hospitals and other
safety-net providers not covered by the MDRP in order to save
costs.26 Congress enacted 340B to fix this unintended consequence
by preserving the drug discounts manufacturers previously offered
safety-net providers. To that end, 340B “imposes ceilings on prices
drug manufacturers may charge for medications sold to specified
health care facilities,” many of which are “providers of safety-net
services to the poor.”27
For the sake of clarity, the 340B program may be best understood
in economics terminology as the interplay between supply and de-
mand: supply from pharmaceutical manufacturers and demand
from covered entities and patients. On the supply side, as a condi-
tion to receiving Medicaid matching funds under state Medicaid
programs or participating in the Department of Defense and VA
prescription drug contracting programs, any pharmaceutical man-
ufacturer28 that sells “covered outpatient drugs”29 must enter into a
Pharmaceutical Pricing Agreement (PPA) with the HHS Secretary
to provide certain drugs to “covered entities” at a discounted rate.30
The definition of a “covered drug” generally includes only certain
25. See infra note 40.
26. BIOTECH, supra note 5, at 6; MULCAHY ET AL., supra note 22, at 5. 
27. Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cty., 131 S. Ct. 1342, 1345 (2011).
28. “Manufacturer” is defined broadly by the Social Security Act as any entity that
engages in—
(A) the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion, or
processing of prescription drug products, either directly or indirectly by
extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of
chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, or
(B) in the packaging, repackaging, labeling, relabeling, or distribution of
prescription drug products.
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(5) (2015). 340B’s definition of “manufacturer” applies regardless of
whether the entity participates in the Medicaid rebate program. Guidance Regarding Section
602 of the Veterans Health Care Act of 1992; Limitation on Prices of Drugs Purchased by
Covered Entities, 58 Fed. Reg. 27,291 (May 7, 1993).
29. See infra note 31. 
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(1); Astra, 131 S. Ct. at 1345; Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev. v.
Shalala, 173 F.3d 438, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1999). For a more thorough discussion of “covered
entities,” see infra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
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outpatient drugs dispensed by a “covered entity”; inpatient services
are not covered.31
Once a manufacturer has signed a PPA, it is barred from charging
covered entities any drug price exceeding a cap set by HHS.32 This
price cap, called the ceiling price, is calculated by subtracting the
Medicaid unit rebate amount33 (essentially a minimum discount)34
from the average manufacturer price (AMP).35 
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 256b(b)(2); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-442, MEDICARE
PART B DRUGS: ACTION NEEDED TO REDUCE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO PRESCRIBE 340B
DRUGS AT PARTICIPATING HOSPITALS 7 n.23 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/670676. pdf
[http://perma.cc/Z5FJ-U2CV] [hereinafter GAO 2015 REPORT] (noting that “outpatient covered
drugs may include: prescription drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration; certain
over-the-counter drugs provided as prescriptions; biological products, other than vaccines,
which can be dispensed only by a prescription; and insulin approved by the Food and Drug
Administration”). The definition of a “covered drug” is linked to the Social Security Act’s
(SSA) definition of “covered outpatient drug” in § 1927(k)(2). See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 256b(b)(2)(A), 1396r-8(k)(2). The SSA requires that the covered drugs be dispensed only
upon prescription and meet standard certification protocols. Id. § 1396r-8(k)(2). The Act also
provides that some specific types of drugs may be excluded from coverage, id. § 1396r-8(d)(2),
and limits coverage for drugs “provided as part of, or as incident to and in the same setting
as,” among other things, “[i]npatient hospital services, [h]ospice services, [d]ental services, ...
[or] [o]utpatient hospital services,” id. § 1396r-8(k)(3). The clear implication is that the
definition of a covered drug is tied to the type of entity to which it is sold by the manufacturer;
in other words, Drug A may be a “covered drug” for Entity A, but not for Entity B.
Interestingly, the SSA’s definition of “covered entity” links directly to 340B’s definition of
“covered entity,” bringing the definitional chain full circle. See id. § 1396r-8(a)(5)(B). In short,
whether a manufacturer must offer a discount on a particular drug depends almost entirely
on the nature of the entity to which the manufacturer sells the drug. In certain specific cases,
however, the nature of the medication may be dispositive. See infra Part II.A.1.
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(1).
33. This is calculated under the complex statutory formula in 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c). The
total possible rebate percentage is capped at 100 percent of the price of the drug. Id. § 1396r-
8(c)(2)(D). Because the rebate calculation is quite intricate, it is enough for current purposes
to deal only with the minimum rebate possible, though it is important to note that the
minimum rebate is only a floor.
34. From January 1, 2010, onward, the minimum discount for generic drugs and pre-
scribed over-the-counter drugs is 13 percent of a drug’s AMP. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 256b(a)(2)(B),
1396r-8(c)(3)(B). The minimum discount for brand-name drugs is the greater of 23.1 percent
of AMP, see id. § 1396r-8(c)(1)(B)(i), or AMP less the best price offered to any other purchaser,
see id. § 1396r-8(c)(1)(C).
35. The AMP for a drug is calculated as the average price a manufacturer charges for the
drug in the United States to wholesalers and retail community pharmacies. Id. § 1396r-
8(k)(1). Manufacturers report these prices as proprietary information to the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and may be subject to audit by HHS. See HHS, OFFICE
OF INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-05-05-00240, MEDICAID DRUG PRICE COMPARISONS: AVERAGE MAN-
UFACTURER PRICE TO PUBLISHED PRICES 4 (2005), http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-05-05-
00240.pdf [http://perma.cc/5V7A-4SJL].
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For example, suppose a drug manufacturer (A-Corp) produces
an innovator drug36 called Rx-A, for which A-Corp receives an aver-
age price of $100 from both wholesalers and retail pharmacies.
Assuming that the applicable discount percentage is the statutory
minimum discount of 23.1 percent for brand-name drugs, the ceil-
ing price that A-Corp may charge covered entities for Rx-A is
$76.90. Unsurprisingly, manufacturers are completely free to charge
less than the ceiling price if they choose.37
On the demand side, to qualify as a “covered entity” and receive
340B drug discounts, a provider must either receive money from
one of ten types of federal grants or qualify as one of six specified
types of hospitals.38 All of the grantee eligibility criteria are
specifically tied to certain patient groups that are targeted for
special assistance.39 Hospital eligibility is similarly linked to specific
populations: disproportionate share hospitals (DSH),40 children’s
hospitals and free-standing cancer hospitals subject to certain
36. An “innovator drug” is one that is “marketed under an original new drug application
approved by the Food and Drug Administration.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(7)(A)(ii).
37. See id. § 256b(a)(10).
38. See id. § 256b(a)(4); GAO 2011 REPORT, supra note 4, at 8; BIOTECH, supra note 5, at
7. In 2010, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) expanded the original eligibility list “to include free-
standing cancer hospitals, critical access hospitals, sole community hospitals and rural refer-
ral centers.” MULCAHY ET AL., supra note 22, at 6.
39. For example, HIV patients, AIDS patients, black lung patients, hemophilia patients,
Native Hawaiian Health Centers, and urban Indian organizations. 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(4)(D)-
(I).
40. Id. § 256b(a)(4)(L). A disproportionate share hospital is one that:
is owned or operated by a unit of State or local government, is a public or private
non-profit corporation which is formally granted governmental powers by a unit
of State or local government, or is a private non-profit hospital which has a
contract with a State or local government to provide health care services to low
income individuals who are not entitled to benefits under title XVIII of the
Social Security Act ... or eligible for assistance under the State plan under this
subchapter.
Id. § 256b(a)(4)(L)(i). Additionally, to qualify as a DSH, a hospital must have had a dispropor-
tionate share adjustment percentage (DSAP) greater than 11.75 percent for the most recent
cost reporting period as calculated under the SSA’s statutory formula. Id. § 256b(a)(4)(L)(ii).
Rural referral centers and sole community hospitals are only required to have an 8 percent
DSAP. Id. § 256b(a)(4)(O). Broadly speaking, the more Medicaid/Medicare patients a hospital
treats as a percentage of the hospital’s total patient population, the higher the hospital’s
DSAP. GAO 2011 REPORT, supra note 4, at 5 n.15. The DSAP is an established way to identify
hospitals that expend large amounts of uncompensated service on indigent populations,
making it a useful trigger for 340B eligibility.
2015] DRUGS FOR THE INDIGENT 645
provisions,41 critical access hospitals,42 sole community hospitals,43
and rural referral centers.44 DSHs were targeted by 340B from its
original enactment; children’s hospitals were included in 2006, and
the other hospital types were added to the program under the
Affordable Care Act (ACA).45 Off-site clinics and other care facilities
associated with 340B entities may also participate in the program
if they are “integral part[s]” of the entity, included on the covered
entity’s most recent Medicare cost report.46
Covered entities must adhere to certain additional requirements
under 340B to remain eligible. Among other criteria, covered enti-
ties may not claim both 340B price reductions and “medical assis-
tance” under the MDRP: a so-called duplicate discount.47 The HHS
Secretary is tasked with establishing a mechanism to ensure com-
pliance with this provision.48 Additionally, if a covered entity re-
ceives a 340B discount on a drug, the entity may not “resell or
otherwise transfer” the drug to anyone who is not a patient of the
entity.49 For example, Entity A cannot collect a discount on a drug,
resell the drug on the open market for full market price, and profit
from the difference.
To ensure compliance, 340B establishes auditing and sanction
mechanisms for those entities that violate the double-discount and
resell prohibitions.50 Interestingly, the program ran nearly twenty
years without any formal auditing by HRSA, instead relying pri-
marily on “self-policing” by both manufacturers and covered enti-
ties.51 HRSA increased its oversight only after the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) released a report in 2011 concluding
that HRSA’s guidance to that point was “inadequate to provide rea-
sonable assurance that covered entities and drug manufacturers are
41. Id. § 256b(a)(4)(M).
42. Id. § 256b(a)(4)(N).
43. Id. § 256b(a)(4)(O).
44. Id. 
45. GAO 2011 REPORT, supra note 4, at 9 n.24.
46. GAO 2015 REPORT, supra note 31, at 8 (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 47,884 (Sept. 19, 1994)).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(5)(A). 
48. Id.
49. Id. § 256b(a)(5)(B). See infra Part II.A.1 for a discussion of the problems surrounding
the ambiguous definition of a “patient.”
50. 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(5)(C)-(D). 
51. GAO 2011 REPORT, supra note 4, at 21; MULCAHY ET AL., supra note 22, at 7.
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in compliance with program requirements.”52 In the wake of the
2011 GAO Report, HRSA required that “covered entities [1] recer-
tify their eligibility every year, [2] immediately notify HRSA if they
experience changes in eligibility, [3] register new outpatient facil-
ities and contract pharmacy agreements on a quarterly basis, and
[4] perform annual internal audits of their 340B programs.”53 The
requirements for covered entities continue to evolve as HRSA issues
additional guidance.54
B. The Current Scope and Growth of 340B
By any measurement, the 340B program involves a significant
amount of money and thousands of covered entities, and continues
to grow at a rapid pace. According to the RAND Corporation, as
of late 2014, there were an estimated 7898 covered entities en-
rolled in 340B, comprising 16,869 covered entity sites.55 Other
estimates report that, as of March 2015, there were over 30,000
52. MULCAHY ET AL., supra note 22, at 7.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Drug Pricing Program Omnibus Guidance, 80 Fed. Reg. 52,300 (proposed
Aug. 28, 2015). The Omnibus Guidance is ambitious in scope, covering eight general areas:
(1) “Program Eligibility and Registration,” id. at 52,301-05, 52,316-19; (2) “Drugs Eligible for
Purchase,” id. at 52,305-06, 52,319; (3) “Individuals Eligible to Receive 340B Drugs,” id. at
52,306-08, 52,319; (4) “Covered Entity Requirements,” id. at 52,308-10; (5) “Contract Phar-
macy Arrangements,” id. at 52,310-11, 52,320-21; (6) “Manufacturer Responsibilities,” id. at
52,311-13, 52,321-22; (7) “Rebate Options for AIDS Drug Assistance Programs,” id. at 52,313-
14, 52,322; and (8) “Program Integrity,” id. at 52,314-16, 52,322-24. The majority of the
proposals are generally tangential, and thus not relevant, to the purposes of this Note. For
a brief summary of these proposals, see Alan J. Arville et al., Health Resources and Service
Administration (HRSA) Issues Proposed “Omnibus Guidance,” NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 28, 2015),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/health-resources-and-service-administration-hrsa-
issues-proposed-omnibus-guidance [http://perma.cc/EN97-K985]. The one portion relevant to
this Note is the section clarifying the definition of a “patient” for 340B purposes. Part II.A.1
discusses this clarification and its implications in more depth.
55. MULCAHY ET AL., supra note 22, at 8; see also GAO 2011 REPORT, supra note 4, at 2-3.
These numbers are estimated using the entity information from HRSA’s 340B dataset. See
generally 340B Drug Pricing Program Database, HRSA OFF. OF PHARMACY AFF., https://opanet.
hrsa.gov/340B/Default [http://perma.cc/YAN3-66RT] (last visited Oct. 23, 2015). Covered enti-
ties may also disperse 340B covered drugs at “off-site facilities,” such as outpatient clinics,
which are included within the 340B designation of the parent covered entity. See Notice
Regarding Section 602 of the Veteran Health Care Act of 1992 Outpatient Hospital Facilities,
59 Fed. Reg. 47,884 (Sept. 19, 1994); see also GAO 2011 REPORT, supra note 4, at 10.
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340B-participating sites.56 Of these covered entities, 1673 are hos-
pitals, amounting to roughly 40 percent of all hospitals nationwide.57
340B-participating hospitals account for roughly 48 percent of all
U.S. outpatient hospital visits, and 38 percent by DSHs alone.58 The
scope of the 340B program is quite expansive, even if measured only
by the sheer number of entities involved.
As to growth, the number of covered entity sites nearly doubled
in the decade from 2001 to 2011, from 8605 to 16,572.59 Section
340B contract pharmacy arrangements have also exploded in num-
ber: in 1999, there were 70 pharmacies contracted under 340B; in
2013, the number of contract pharmacies totaled 12,240.60 Addi-
tionally, in light of the ACA’s additions to the definition of “covered
entity” and its expansion of the Medicaid program, there is no doubt
that the number of 340B enrollees will continue to grow signifi-
cantly.61
The amount of pharmaceutical medication purchased under the
340B program is sizable. The GAO estimated in 2011 that outpa-
tient drug purchases under the 340B program totaled at least $6
billion annually;62 that number has risen to an estimated $15 billion
56. See AVALERE HEALTH, HOSPITAL ACQUISITIONS OF PHYSICIAN PRACTICES AND THE
340B PROGRAM, 3 (2015), http://340breform.org/userfiles/Avalere%20Acquisition.pdf [http://
perma.cc/W6QK-3FM9].
57. Julia E. Tomkins, Policy Statement on the 340B Drug Pricing Program, 10 J. ONCOL-
OGY PRAC. 259, 259 (2014) [hereinafter ASCO Statement]; see also GAO 2015 REPORT, supra
note 31, at 1. 
58. MULCAHY ET AL., supra note 22, at 8.
59. GAO 2011 REPORT, supra note 4, at 8. 
60. BIOTECH, supra note 5, at 13. Covered entities use contract pharmacies to distribute
340B prescriptions off-site, which allows greater flexibility in dealing with patient needs.
ASCO Statement, supra note 57, at 260. HRSA originally allowed only entities without an on-
site pharmacy to contract with an off-site pharmacy. Notice Regarding Section 602 of the
Veterans Health Care Act of 1992; Contract Pharmacy Services, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,549, 43,555
(Aug. 23, 1996). Shortly before the ACA was passed in 2010, HRSA amended their guidance
and allowed all hospitals to enter into contract pharmacy arrangements. Notice Regarding
340B Drug Pricing Program-Contract Pharmacy Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,272, 10,273 (Mar.
5, 2010). This accounts for the rapid expansion in contract pharmacies since 2010: 2646 to
6915 in the first year alone, a 161 percent increase. ASCO Statement, supra note 57, at 260.
61. BIOTECH, supra note 5, at 13-14; ASCO Statement, supra note 57, at 260. Recent data
suggest that 340B entities may acquire physician practices in order to realize additional
profits under the 340B program. See AVALERE HEALTH, supra note 56, at 2-3. Absent a
fundamental change in the nature of the program, it can be expected to grow because strong
incentives exist to maximize hospital profits. 
62. GAO 2011 REPORT, supra note 4, at 2. 
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in 2015.63 The industry frequently cites that 340B purchases total
roughly 2 percent of all drug purchases in the United States,64 but
the real figure is likely closer to 5 percent and rising.65 340B pur-
chases are conservatively expected to grow to $18.5 billion by 2016,
and $25 billion by 2019.66 Assuming that 340B discounts are simi-
lar to those under the Medicaid Prescription Drug Rebate program,
340B currently saves participating hospitals a conservatively esti-
mated $1.6 billion annually.67
II. 340B CHALLENGES
The current 340B program contains problems that present dif-
ficult challenges for policymakers. This Note roughly categorizes
these problems as either immediate or fundamental. Contributing
to the former category are the insufficient guidance regarding the
definition of a “patient,”68 and the mounting skepticism and criti-
cism of some 340B covered entities for profiting millions of dollars
annually from the program.69 These problems, however, are symp-
toms of more fundamental issues. The latter category strikes more
at the heart of the program itself: HHS’s inability to properly
administer 340B due to the lack of a congressional mandate, illus-
trated by the “orphan drug rule” litigation,70 and the competing
incentives and interests between drug manufacturers and safety-net
hospitals.71 
63. See VANDERVELDE, supra note 4, at 3.
64. See, e.g., 340B Drug Pricing Program, AM. HOSP. ASS’N, http://www.aha.org/research/
policy/infographics/340b.shtml [http://perma.cc/ZX9S-794R] (last visited Oct. 23, 2015); CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES tbl. 16, http://www.cms.
gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealth
ExpendData/Downloads/tables.pdf [http://perma.cc/D27U-S83B].
65. See VANDERVELDE, supra note 4, at 3.
66. Id. It is important to note that these figures are in constant flux as a result of the
rapid growth in the number of 340B-participating entities and the malleable nature of statis-
tics. Other sources, even recently, have estimated lower totals. See, e.g., Travis Jackson, A
Matter of Interpretation: How the Orphan Drug Litigation Tests the Limits of 340B Program
Guidance, 16 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 5, 5 (2014) (noting that 340B sales are “expected
to hit $16 billion by 2019”).
67. MULCAHY ET AL., supra note 22, at 8. 
68. See infra Part II.A.1.
69. See infra Part II.A.2.
70. See infra Part II.B.1.
71. See infra Part II.B.2.
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A. Immediate Problems with 340B
1. Definition and Guidance on the Meaning of “Patient”
In its 2011 340B report, the GAO concluded that “HRSA’s guid-
ance on key program requirements often lacks the necessary level
of specificity to provide clear direction, making it difficult for par-
ticipants to self-police or monitor others’ compliance and raising
concerns that the guidance may be interpreted in ways that are
inconsistent with its intent.”72
Consistent with the GAO’s critique, ambiguous definitions and
insufficient guidance have been and are problems within the 340B
program. A prime example is that, despite repeated calls from
stakeholders for clarification, HRSA has only recently offered guid-
ance on the central definition of what constitutes a “patient.”73
Although HRSA initially defined “patient” in 199674 and promised
a more thorough treatment of the subject,75 it was not until August
2015 that HRSA followed up on its promise.76
The 1996 definition gave covered entities wide discretion as to
which patients could receive 340B drugs, creating unnecessary
confusion. The 1996 guidance delineated three criteria for patient
eligibility:
72. GAO 2011 REPORT, supra note 4, at 22.
73. Jaimy Lee, Expected 340B Drug Discount Rule May Tighten Program, MOD. HEALTH-
CARE (May 15, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140515/NEWS/305159940
[http://perma.cc/CGU2-BNLN]. In November 2014, HRSA scrapped the proposed “mega-reg”
it had announced it would issue on definition issues and other problems. Ellyn L. Sternfield,
The 340B Mega-Reg Is Dead re: Drug Discount Program, NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 19, 2014),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/340b-mega-reg-dead-re-drug-discount-program
[http://perma.cc/F8DG-4VH2]. HRSA likely dropped the proposal due to the tension between
the orphan drug litigation and the D.C. District Court’s ruling that HHS did not have the
congressional authority to issue legislative rules. Id.
74. Notice Regarding Section 602 of the Veterans Health Care Act of 1992 Patient and
Entity Eligibility, 61 Fed. Reg. 55,156, 55,156-58 (Oct. 24, 1996).
75. Notice Regarding Section 602 of the Veterans Health Care Act of 1992 Definition of
a “Patient,” 72 Fed. Reg. 1543, 1544 (Jan. 12, 2007).
76. See 340B Drug Pricing Program Omnibus Guidance, 80 Fed. Reg. 52,300, 52,319 (pro-
posed Aug. 28, 2015).
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(1) the covered entity has established a relationship with the
individual, such that the covered entity maintains records of the
individual’s health care; and
(2) the individual receives health care services from a health
care professional who is either employed by the covered entity
or provides health care under contractual or other arrangements
(e.g. referral for consultation) such that responsibility for the
care provided remains with the covered entity; and
(3) the individual receives a health care service or range of
services from the covered entity which is consistent with the ser-
vice or range of services for which grant funding or Federally-
qualified health center look-alike status has been provided.77
Three points are worth noting. First, the definition of patient—
and therefore patient eligibility—is conditioned primarily upon en-
tity eligibility, essentially qualifying all patients of an entity so long
as the entity itself is qualified. Consequently, covered entities may
reap significant profits from the discounts they receive. Part II.A.2
discusses this in greater detail. Second, absent anywhere in the
definition is an income or insurance requirement. Although Con-
gress’s original intent for 340B may have been to help safety-net
hospitals and indigent populations, any patient, regardless of their
wealth, could qualify for 340B discounted drugs through a qualified
entity. Perhaps this would not be a significant problem if covered
entities distinguished between patients themselves, but as Part
II.A.2 discusses, this does not seem to happen. Third, many of the
terms in this definition are themselves left undefined and are
vulnerable to a wide range of interpretation. For example, “main-
tain[ing] records of the individual’s health care”78 has become almost
meaningless with the rise of digital medical records, which may be
stored in an off-site server and accessed by multiple care providers.79
77. Notice Regarding Section 602 of the Veterans Health Care Act of 1992 Patient and
Entity Eligibility, 61 Fed. Reg. at 55,156-58.
78. Id. at 55,157.
79. This ambiguity may be further exacerbated by the rise of Accountable Care Organ-
izations (ACOs) and Health Information Exchanges (HIEs), which promote integrated service
and the sharing of patient information between care providers. See generally Ctrs. for Medi-
care & Medicaid Servs., Accountable Care Organizations, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/
Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO/index.html [http://perma.cc/T6A7-U6VV]
(last modified Jan. 6, 2015); Health Information Exchange, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.
healthit.gov/providers-professionals/health-information-exchange/what-hie [http://perma.cc/
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HRSA’s Omnibus Guidance updates, but does not fully resolve,
the patient definition problem. The Omnibus Guidance narrows the
scope of the 1996 definition by adding additional specific factors for
patient eligibility.80 With notable exceptions,81 the proposals seem
to clarify the scope and meaning of “patient,” perhaps alleviating
some of the problems discussed under the third point above. The
first two points, however, apply with equal force to the new guid-
ance, and further agency guidance is unlikely to sufficiently resolve
the tension.
Fundamentally, if patient eligibility is contingent on covered
entity eligibility, covered entities should have a way to distinguish
B8TL-YXHH] (last updated May 12, 2014). The interplay of the rise of coordinated health care
and the 340B program is not the focus of this Note. It is enough for present purposes to note
that any ambiguities in 340B’s definitions will likely be aggravated by the  modernization and
integration of the healthcare industry. At bottom, definitions that may have sufficed in 1996
do not necessarily harmonize well with modern medicine.
80. 340B Drug Pricing Program Omnibus Guidance, 80 Fed. Reg. at 52,319. The guidance
delineates six factors:
(1) The individual receives a health care service at a covered entity site which
is registered for the 340B Program and listed on the public 340B database; 
(2) The individual receives a health care service from a health care provider
employed by the covered entity or who is an independent contractor of the
covered entity such that the covered entity may bill for services on behalf of the
provider; 
(3) An individual receives a drug that is ordered or prescribed by the covered
entity provider as a result of the service described in (2). An individual will not
be considered a patient of the covered entity if the only health care received by
the individual from the covered entity is the infusion of a drug or the dispensing
of a drug; 
(4) The individual receives a health care service that is consistent with the
covered entity’s scope of grant, project or contract;
(5) The individual is classified as an outpatient when the drug is ordered or
prescribed. The patient’s classification status is determined by how the services
for the patient are billed to the insurer …. An individual who is self-pay,
uninsured, or whose cost of care is covered by the covered entity will be
considered a patient if the covered entity has clearly defined policies and
procedures that it follows to classify such individuals consistently; and
(6) The individual has a relationship with the covered entity such that the
covered entity maintains access to auditable health care records which
demonstrate that the covered entity has a provider-to-patient relationship, that
the responsibility for care is with the covered entity, and that each element of
this patient definition in this section is met for each 340B drug.
81. For example, the guidance notes that “HHS interprets this section to include all
patients that meet all of the following criteria on a prescription-by-prescription or order-by-
order basis.” Id. No indication is given as to how this ad hoc analysis impacts patient
eligibility or how HRSA intends to implement this in the future, if at all.
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between patients based on their ability to pay for medication. It
makes little sense for covered entities, regardless of how they qual-
ify for 340B, to receive the same discounts from manufacturers for
medications prescribed to patients who are fully insured as those
prescribed to patients with no ability to pay. This is true, of course,
unless patients are not treated as a homogeneous class, meaning
that covered entities could either collect or pass on different dis-
counts to separately defined groups of patients based on their ability
to pay. Part III.A.2.a discusses this possibility in more detail.
Considering the scope of 340B and the money at stake, ambiguity
and tension within the definition of “patient” is problematic for both
HRSA and covered entities. Further guidance cannot sufficiently
resolve the patient definition problem, due to the inherent non-
binding and ambiguous nature of agency guidance. More fundamen-
tal change is needed. Part III will discuss a better solution.
2. Hospital Profits
Section 340B-participating covered entities have recently suf-
fered severe scrutiny from critics who argue that 340B entities are
illegitimately profiting off the program’s discounts.82 Two primary
factors contribute to this debate. First, hospitals receiving 340B
discounts are not required under the program to pass on any of the
340B savings to the patients purchasing the drugs.83 Thus, covered
82. See, e.g., Helen Adamopoulos, Are Hospitals Abusing the 340B Drug Discount
Program? New Study Reignites Controversy, BECKER’S HOSP. CFO (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.
beckershospitalreview.com/finance/are-hospitals-abusing-the-340b-drug-discount-program-
new-study-reignites-controversy.html [http://perma.cc/3SSP-QYXJ]; Scott Gottlieb, Opinion,
How ObamaCare Hurts Patients, WALL ST. J. (July 30, 2013, 7:16 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424127887324110404578630522319113676 [http://perma.cc/X3Y7-
FK6T]; Andrew Pollack, Dispute Develops over Discount Drug Program, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/13/business/dispute-develops-over-340b-discount-
drug-program.html [http://perma.cc/Q9AF-74B9].
83. See Rena M. Conti & Peter B. Bach, Cost Consequences of the 340B Drug Discount
Program, 309 JAMA 1995, 1995 (2013), http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=
1680369 [http://perma.cc/NQ7F-FHJF]. Critics of the 340B program characterize this revenue
stream as “profit,” and argue that the lack of a “pass-on” requirement is a noticeable gap in
the program and is a win for the hospitals and a loss for the patients. See Stephen T. Parente
& Michael Ramlet, Unprecedented Growth, Questionable Policy: The 340B Drug Program
(Med. Indus. Leadership Inst., Working Paper), http://carlsonschool.umn.edu/faculty-research/
medical-industry-leadership-institute/publications/working-papers-archives [http://perma.cc/
B8YH-394V]; Sally Pipes, In Federal Drug Program, Hospitals and Pharmacies Use the Poor
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entities may purchase pharmaceuticals at 340B prices and resell
the medication to their patients at full price.84 Second, under the
flexible definition of “patient,” participating hospitals can collect
discounts on a wide variety of patients—from the uninsured to those
with the best health insurance coverage.85 Section 340B hospitals
can therefore “generate profits by prescribing drugs to patients who
have private insurance or Medicare.”86
In June 2015, the GAO published a report on the 340B program
comparing Medicare Part B reimbursement to 340B covered entities
with reimbursement to non-340B entities.87 The report concluded
that “[o]n average, per beneficiary Medicare spending on Part B
drugs in 2008 and 2012 was substantially higher at 340B DSH
hospitals compared with non-340B hospitals.”88 Generally, this
difference in spending could not be explained by “hospital character-
istics or patients’ health status,” which suggests that, on average,
“Medicare beneficiaries were prescribed more drugs, more expensive
drugs, or both, at 340B DSH hospitals.”89 These findings led the
to Get Rich, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2014, 11:06 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sallypipes/2014/
08/15/in-federal-drug-program-hospitals-and-pharmacies-use-the-poor-to-get-rich/ [http://
perma.cc/SQ97-M4H7]. On the other hand, 340B’s proponents call the revenue “savings,” and
contend that hospitals use the money to benefit their vulnerable patients. SAFETY NET HOSPS.
FOR PHARM. ACCESS, SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON 340B: A RESPONSE TO CRITICS 4
(2013), www.340bhealth.org/files/Setting_the_Record_Straight_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/
67EW-C79P]. Both sides make some legitimate points, but because 340B is such a complex
program and the competing interests are so intense, much of the nuance of the conflict is lost
in both sides’ broad brushstrokes.
84. This is assuming, of course, that the covered entities fulfill all other requirements.
85. See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, to Mary K. Wakefield, Adm’r, HRSA (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.grassley.senate.
gov/sites/default/files/about/upload/2013-03-27-CEG-to-HRSA-340B-Oversight-3.pdf [http://
perma.cc/6XAJ-HQBJ] [hereinafter Grassley Letter]. This stems in part from the lack of an
income trigger in 340B’s definition of a patient. Because patient eligibility is conditioned
primarily upon covered entity eligibility, hospitals have wide latitude in dispensing 340B
drugs. See supra Part II.A.1.
86. Rena M. Conti & Peter B. Bach, The 340B Drug Discount Program: Hospitals Generate
Profits by Expanding to Reach More Affluent Communities, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1786, 1786 (2014)
(citing Conti & Bach, supra note 83, at 1995).
87. See GAO 2015 REPORT, supra note 31.
88. Id. at 30.
89. Id. at 20, 30. Specifically, the GAO reported that, “in 2012, average per beneficiary
spending at 340B DSH hospitals was $144, compared to $60 and $62 at non-340B DSH and
other non-340B hospitals, respectively.” Id. at 20. This difference could severely impact
indigent patients at 340B DSH hospitals through higher medication co-payments and
resulting increased insurance premiums. Id. at 29.
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GAO to conclude that “340B hospitals may be responding to [the]
incentive to maximize Medicare revenues,” posing “serious conse-
quences to the Medicare program and its beneficiaries.”90
Section 340B profits can be significant. In 2012, Senator Charles
Grassley collected data from three North Carolina hospitals to
discover how much revenue the hospitals collected as a result of
participating in the 340B program.91 In 2008, Carolinas Medical
Center gained $13 million from 340B savings, UNC Hospital gained
$33 million, and Duke University Health System gained $89
million.92 By 2012, those numbers had increased to $21 million, $65
million, and $136 million, respectively.93 Specifically, Duke’s 2012
340B revenue constituted 6 percent of its $2.329 billion in net
patient service revenue for the year.94 Ninety-five percent of Duke’s
patients were covered through Medicaid, Medicare, and commercial
insurance.95 The other two hospitals showed similar trends.96 These
findings indicate that, at least for these hospitals, 340B generates
sizable profits or savings from insured populations. 
In 2014, Health Affairs published a hotly contested study
reporting that hospitals signing onto the 340B program after 2004
tended to be located in higher-income communities than those that
joined earlier.97 The data seem to fit with the rise in media com-
plaints regarding illegitimate 340B profits.98 As the study’s critics
point out, however, the census data utilized by the study does not
show the incomes of the patients the hospitals actually treated.99
That said, if 340B is a program designed to alleviate the cost of
90. Id. at 30.
91. See Grassley Letter, supra note 85.
92. Id. 
93. Id.
94. See DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. & AFFILIATES, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATE-
MENTS (2013), http://emma.msrb.org/ER710834-ER551226-ER952286.pdf [http://perma.cc/
VVB6-FQJ9].
95. See Grassley Letter, supra note 85. Duke responded that it reinvested at least some
of its 340B earnings into “primary care wellness clinics within four Durham [North Carolina]
public schools.... These [ ]clinics operate during the school year and provide medical and
mental health services, including medical coverage during weekends and school holidays.” Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Conti & Bach, supra note 86, at 1789-90.
98. See Adamopoulos, supra note 82; Pollack, supra note 82.
99. See Maureen Testoni & Charles Hart, Drug Discount Analysis Misses the Mark,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 8, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/10/08/drug-discount-
analysis-misses-the-mark/ [http://perma.cc/S5B7-VTFL]. 
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expensive medication for safety-net hospitals and indigent patients,
one would likely expect the majority of participants to be located in
lower-income areas. Although the absence of such a finding is cer-
tainly not definitive proof of unfair profit seeking by 340B partici-
pants, it does call into question the purpose of the program and
whether its current scope is appropriate.
Regardless of the validity of either side’s arguments, the very
existence of this debate betrays more fundamental competing inter-
ests. As 340B continues to expand, these mini-debates will continue
to churn.100
B. Fundamental Problems with 340B
1. Authority Structure
HHS—and HRSA by extension—does not have the necessary
grant of authority from Congress to properly implement the 340B
program.101 Congress granted HHS authority to issue legislative
rules regarding the 340B program in three very limited circum-
stances only: (1) establishing an administrative dispute resolution
process;102 (2) regulating the precise standards for calculating 340B
ceiling prices;103 and (3) imposing monetary civil sanctions.104 Thus,
HHS’s administrative hands are often tied when it comes to up-
dating and implementing 340B. The litigation over the “orphan drug
rule” is illustrative.
100. This discussion does not touch on fraud, another opportunity for significant profit for
340B covered entities. The purpose of this Note, however, is to explore problems and solutions
within the legitimate bounds of the 340B program. Considering the current self-policing
nature of the program, there is ample opportunity for 340B fraud, but attempting to close all
loopholes is outside the scope of this Note.
101. See generally Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. HHS (PhRMA I), 43 F. Supp. 3d 28,
39-45 (D.D.C. 2014).
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 256b(d)(3)(A) (2015).
103. See id. § 256b(d)(1)(B)(i)(I).
104. See id. § 256b(d)(1)(B)(vi).
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a. Orphan Drug Exemption: PhRMA Litigation and HHS’s
Unclear Authority
In 1983, Congress passed the Orphan Drug Act (ODA) as an
amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.105
Congress intended the ODA “to facilitate the development of drugs
for rare diseases and conditions.”106 A “rare disease or condition” is
defined as one which “affects less than 200,000 persons in the
United States, or ... affects more than 200,000 ... and for which there
is no reasonable expectation that the cost of developing and making
available ... a drug for such disease or condition will be recovered
from sales.”107 To encourage production of so-called orphan drugs,
the ODA created incentives for pharmaceutical manufacturers:
“(1) a seven-year market exclusivity period for the orphan drug[,] ...
(2) a clinical tax credit for any expenses incurred in developing an
orphan drug, ... (3) research grants for clinical testing, ... and (4) an
exemption from new drug application fees.”108
Outside the 340B context, the ODA presents legitimate incentives
for pharmaceutical manufacturers. However, because 340B and the
ODA incentivize countervailing and logically inconsistent actions—
340B imposes a price ceiling on pharmaceutical sales, while the
ODA grants drug manufacturers short-term monopoly power—Con-
gress exempted orphan drugs from 340B discounts in 2010 to
maintain the ODA’s incentives within 340B.109 In short, 340B
covered entities would not receive program discounts for ODA
pharmaceuticals. 
Because many orphan drugs are also used for non-orphan
purposes,110 HHS published a rule on July 23, 2013,111 establishing
105. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (Jan. 4, 1983).
106. PhRMA I, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 31.
107. 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2).
108. PhRMA I, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 31.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 256b(e). The exemption only applied to entities newly eligible for coverage
under the ACA; namely, free-standing cancer hospitals, critical access hospitals, rural referral
centers, and sole community hospitals. Id. The orphan drug exception reads: “the term ‘cov-
ered outpatient drug’ shall not include a drug designated by the Secretary ... for a rare disease
or condition.” Id. 
110. For example, Prozac is commonly used to treat depression (a non-orphan purpose), but
is also labeled an orphan drug when used to treat autism and body dysmorphic disorder in
children. PhRMA I, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 30, 32-33; see also HRSA, ORPHAN DRUG DESIGNATIONS
AND APPROVALS LIST 72 (2015), www.hrsa.gov/opa/programrequirements/orphandrug
2015] DRUGS FOR THE INDIGENT 657
that orphan drugs are not exempted from 340B discounts when
“they are transferred, prescribed, sold, or otherwise used for any
medically-accepted indication other than treating the rare disease
or condition for which the drug was designated.”112 The practical
upshot of the rule was to place orphan drugs used for orphan pur-
poses outside the 340B scope (maintaining statutory profit incen-
tives for manufacturers), while applying 340B discounts to orphan
drugs used for non-orphan purposes. For example, if DSH
Hospital A prescribed Prozac for an autistic child (an orphan drug
designation),113 the hospital would not be eligible for a 340B
discount. Hospital A would receive a discount, however, if it bought
Prozac to treat an adult diagnosed with depression (a non-orphan
drug designation).114 The HHS Rule also required that hospitals
regulate their sales of medication so as to ensure that no orphan
drugs were used for non-orphan purposes, essentially prohibiting
hospitals from applying for a discount for orphan drugs.115 For
example, it is illegal for a hospital to buy Prozac, claiming it is for
an autistic child (and thereby purchasing the drug for a discount),
and then prescribe it for an adult suffering from depression. This
rule essentially requires all covered entities to track all medications
to make sure that “orphan drugs” go to “orphan patients” and “non-
orphan drugs” go to “non-orphan patients.”116
exclusion/orphandruglist.pdf [http://perma.cc/MA42-2MMY].
111. Exclusion of Orphan Drugs for Certain Covered Entities Under 340B Program, 78
Fed. Reg. 44,016 (July 23, 2013) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 10.21).
112. Orphan Drug Exemption, 42 C.F.R. § 10.21(a) (2013). 
113. Prozac has both orphan and non-orphan designations. See supra note 110. The
reasoning behind Prozac’s “double designation” is odd, considering that the market for
Prozac’s depression treatment was $180 million in 2012. THOMSON REUTERS, SPOTLIGHT ON
DEPRESSION 9 (2014), http://images.info.science.thomsonreuters.biz/Web/ThomsonReuters
Science/%7B913944e2-377c-450b-a9e6-9a11bf8146b7%7D_SpotlightOn-cwp-en_issue15-
low_res.pdf [http://perma.cc/5WJ9-DA34]. Prozac’s thriving market already provides the
incentive for the manufacturer to produce the drug, regardless of its orphan drug designation
for other purposes. Thus, for Prozac, and other drugs like it, the orphan drug designation may
be a windfall that, under current law, benefits the manufacturer at the expense of providers
and indigent patients.
114. In this case, because Prozac is considered a brand-name drug, the minimum discount
is 23.1 percent. See PhRMA I, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 44 n.15.
115. See 42 C.F.R. § 10.21(c)(1).
116. As one can imagine, this process can be more guesswork than anything else, consider-
ing that the exact same drug can be an orphan drug or a non-orphan drug depending on the
patient to whom it is prescribed.
658 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:637
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA)117 sued HHS over the orphan drug rule, arguing that HHS
did not have the statutory authority to issue the rule in the first
place.118 HHS contended that Congress had granted it legislative
authority in three separate provisions: “(1) the establishment of an
administrative dispute resolution process, (2) the ‘regulatory issu-
ance’ of precisely defined standards of methodology for calculation
of ceiling prices, and (3) the imposition of monetary civil sanc-
tions.”119 In the alternative, HHS argued that the Orphan Drug Rule
should be upheld as an interpretive, rather than a legislative,
rule.120
Giving appropriate deference to HHS as the administering
agency,121 the district court examined each provision in turn and
found that “though ... the agency’s proactive, prophylactic rule [is]
the most reasonable way of administering the statute, Congress has
not given HHS the broad rulemaking authority to do so, and
‘[w]here Congress has established a clear line, the agency cannot go
beyond it.’”122 The court held that HHS did have congressional
authority to implement a few specific provisions within 340B, but on
the whole, “HHS lack[ed] statutory rulemaking authority to prom-
ulgate the orphan drug rule at issue.”123 In granting summary judg-
ment and an injunction to the plaintiffs, however, the court declined
117. PhRMA is a trade group representing “the country’s leading biopharmaceutical
researchers and biotechnology companies,” which advocates strongly for: “[1] [b]road patient
access to safe and effective medicines through a free market, without price controls; [2]
[s]trong intellectual property incentives; [3] [a]nd transparent, effective regulation and a free
flow of information to patients.” About PhRMA, PHRMA, http://www.phrma.org/about [http://
perma.cc/29AR-G2S7]. 
118. PhRMA I, 43 F. Supp 3d at 30-31; see also Plaintiff’s Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief ¶ 8, PhRMA I, 43 F. Supp. 3d 28 (No. 13-1501).
119. PhRMA I, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 41.
120. Id. at 45-46. For a more thorough treatment of the implications of legislative versus
interpretive rule theories, especially in this context, see generally Jackson, supra note 66, at
5.
121. The district court determined that Skidmore deference was appropriate in this case
because the agency’s decision was beyond Congress’s grant of authority and thus was “beyond
the Chevron pale.” PhRMA I, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 36 (quoting United States v. Mead, 533 U.S.
218, 234 (2001)).
122. Id. at 45 (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013)).
123. Id. at 37; see also Thomas Barker & Igor Gorlach, PhRMA v. HHS Scales Back HRSA
Rulemaking Power, LAW360 (June 10, 2014, 12:08 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
545512/phrma-v-hhs-scales-back-hrsa-rulemaking-power [http://perma.cc/EM4S-WBVN].
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to address HHS’s “interpretive rule” theory, leaving HHS an argu-
ment to pursue in the future.124 
Unsurprisingly, exactly two months after the district court’s
ruling, HHS reissued the previously vacated orphan drug rule, this
time retitled as an “interpretive rule.”125 PhRMA sued HHS on
October 9, 2014, challenging the rule under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) as “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”126 Reviewing cross
motions for summary judgment, the court ruled in PhRMA’s favor
on October 14, 2015, holding (1) that HHS’s Interpretive Rule was
a final order and thus justiciable under the APA,127 and (2) that
HHS was not entitled to any deference because the Interpretive
Rule was contrary to the plain language of the 340B statute.128
Of particular note, the court specifically clarified that although
PhRMA’s suit challenged “the merits of the Interpretive Rule,”
PhRMA did not contest “HHS’s authority to issue an Interpretive
Rule prospectively setting forth the agency’s reading of the stat-
ute.”129 In fact, the court reasoned, HHS must be able to interpret
the 340B statute if it is to properly administer the program.130
Consequently, the court held that “even though this Court concluded
[in PhRMA I] that HHS lacks the authority to promulgate the rule
as a binding statement of law, HHS is not forbidden altogether from
proffering its interpretation of the statute.”131 Yet, the court also
recognized that the Interpretive Rule at issue in PhRMA II was not
merely interpretive: “[t]he Interpretive Rule very clearly requires
manufacturers and covered entities alike to change their behavior
124. PhRMA I, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 46. The court was “inclined to think [HHS’s interpretive
rule theory was] wrong,” but needed additional briefing if HHS was to pursue the theory
further. Id.
125. See Availability of Interpretive Rule: Implementation of the Exclusion of Orphan
Drugs for Certain Covered Entities Under the 340B Program, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,801 (July 23,
2014).
126. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2015); see also Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. HHS
(PhRMA II), No. 14-1685 (RC), 2015 WL 5996374, at *5 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2015).
127. PhRMA II, 2015 WL 5996374 at *12.
128. Id. at *17.
129. Id. at *6.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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in a not insignificant way.”132 Thus, HHS’s interpretive power seems
quite limited, at least in practice.
The district court’s holdings in PhRMA I and PhRMA II lay out
a problematic path going forward. HHS may not issue general legis-
lative rules regarding 340B’s implementation, outside of the few
specific areas in which HHS has an explicit congressional mandate.
HHS may issue interpretive rules. In light of the practical holding
of PhRMA II, however, HHS’s interpretive powers likely do not
extend very far beyond its own doors. Consequently, HHS’s au-
thority to administer the 340B program is unclear at best. When
HHS’s interpretive rules run contrary to the interests of involved
340B stakeholders, PhRMA’s previous success in litigation opens
the door for additional challenges to HHS’s rulemaking. In the
words of the district court in PhRMA I:
The rulemaking authority granted HHS by Congress under the
340B program has thus been specifically limited, and HHS has
not been granted broad rulemaking authority to carry out all the
provisions of the 340B program. Instead, Congress has limited
HHS’s rulemaking authority ... not to engag[e] in prophylactic
non-adjudicatory rulemaking regarding the 340B program
altogether.133
For a program of this size and scope, HHS needs a broad grant of
statutory authority to implement the program well, especially in
light of 340B’s significant recent growth. The lack of a clear congres-
sional mandate merely creates opportunities for large stakeholders
in 340B, manufacturers and hospitals, to find and exploit loopholes
in the existing program. Without a clear congressional mandate for
HHS to administer 340B, the real question seems to be whether the
132. Id. at *10. The court examined in detail the fact that manufacturers’ failure to comply
with 340B’s requirements—“as interpreted by [HHS’s] Interpretive Rule”—would “expose
manufacturers to significant penalties in future enforcement proceedings. Id. at *11. HHS,
through HRSA, had sent letters to pharmaceutical manufacturers warning them in essence
that failure to comply with the Interpretive Rule would constitute failure to comply with the
statutory requirements themselves, thus equating the rule and the statute, and exposing
manufacturers to significant liability for diverging from HHS’s interpretation. Id. at *9.
133. PhRMA I, 43 Supp. 3d 28, 42-43 (D.D.C. 2014).
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manufacturers and covered entities, rather than HHS, are actually
running the program.134
2. Diverging Interests and the Purpose of 340B
The fundamental issue within the 340B program is the clashing
interests between the parties involved, primarily manufacturers and
hospitals. Currently, manufacturers and hospitals are playing what
is essentially a zero-sum game: increased savings for hospitals
equates to decreased profits for drug corporations, and vice versa.
Considering their opposing incentives, manufacturers and hospitals
consequently offer differing explanations for what Congress origin-
ally intended 340B to be: manufacturers claim that 340B discounts
were intended primarily to help indigent patient populations, while
hospitals contend that 340B’s purpose was to aid hospitals by offer-
ing them drugs savings, and that patients benefit only indirectly.135
Absent 340B, market pressure and government regulation would
incentivize drug manufacturers to maintain a balance between a
134. On March 25, 2015, the House Energy & Commerce Committee held a hearing on the
340B program to investigate alleged problems within its structure. See Examining the 340B
Drug Pricing Program, ENERGY & COMM. COMMITTEE (Mar. 24, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://energy
commerce.house.gov/hearing/examining-340b-drug-pricing-program [http://perma.cc/KWV9-
A9SB]. The testimony in that hearing focused on the lack of transparency and accountability
within 340B. Id. Members of the committee drafted provisions to be included in the 21st
Century Cures bill, but 340B stakeholders clearly were not impressed with the nature of the
measures and caused the amendments to be removed. Ellyn L. Sternfield & Bridgette A.
Wiley, HRSA Takes Its First Steps on 340B Rules, NAT’L L. REV. (June 22, 2015), http://
www.natlawreview.com/article/hrsa-takes-its-first-steps-340b-rules [http://perma.cc/DF43-
VUK5]. Congress may likely take further action to “fix” the program in the future; Part III
proposes a framework for such future legislation.
Furthermore, it should be noted that HRSA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking on June
17, 2015, finally following up on its Advance Notice of Rulemaking from September 2010. Id.
The proposed rules focus exclusively on topics clearly within HRSA’s limited rulemaking
authority: calculating ceiling prices and civil monetary penalties. Id. Generally, the rules are
not major substantive changes and thus are beyond the scope of this Note. See id. Considering
the current ambiguous status of HRSA to issue rules, litigation may again ensue over HRSA’s
authority. There is unlikely to be significant resolution to this merry-go-round until Congress
amends the 340B program from the top down.
135. Compare, e.g., BIOTECH, supra note 5, at 6 (“Congress created the 340B program to
help federal grantees and true safety net hospitals serving low-income, uninsured patients
by reinstating the deep discounts that manufacturers had voluntarily provided to these
facilities before enactment of the 1990 Medicaid drug rebate statute.”), with SAFETY NET
HOSPS., supra note 83, at 2 (arguing that “340B providers are using their program savings to
benefit their vulnerable patients, consistent with congressional intent”).
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competitive price and profit. Prior to 340B and MDRP, manufactur-
ers voluntarily offered heavy discounts to hospitals serving low-
income, uninsured patients.136 Under 340B, however, manufacturers
must offer discounts to covered entities for certain outpatient drugs,
thus forcing manufacturers to operate with a lower profit margin
than they would otherwise, even assuming the minimum discounts
at play. Consequently, the 340B program perversely incentivizes
manufacturers to focus distribution to non-340B entities, for which
the profits are larger.137 Additionally, considering the expanding
scope of 340B discounts, manufacturers are likely to raise prices of
non-340B medications so as not to be overly burdened by the 340B
discount.138 Manufacturers contend that Congress originally intend-
ed the 340B program to help primarily indigent uninsured patients,
not the hospitals serving them.139 Because manufacturers lose
profits under any iteration of 340B, presumably this contention
arises more out of opposition to hospitals collecting larger discounts
than it does out of concern for the patients involved.
Covered entities—including contract pharmacies—are incentiv-
ized under the 340B program to collect the largest discount possible
and keep it. Physicians may even shift their prescriptions to more
expensive outpatient drugs to collect a larger profit.140 This may be
reasonable in light of the statutory scheme; covered entities have no
reason to pass on the discounts to their patients, especially because
many hospitals provide significant amounts of uncompensated care
every year.141 As justification, hospital associations point to the fact
136. See SAFETY NET HOSPS., supra note 83, at 2.
137. 340B’s negative incentives are very clearly demonstrated in the orphan drug context.
The orphan drug rule was intended to incentivize orphan drug production where natural mar-
ket incentives would not otherwise exist. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
Section 340B, however, incentivizes manufacturers not to focus on the discounted drugs. HHS
exempted orphan drugs from the 340B program, because otherwise the incentives from the
Orphan Drug Act would disappear and manufacturers would focus their attention elsewhere.
See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
138. Conti & Bach, supra note 83, at 1996.
139. See, e.g., AIR 340B, UNFULFILLED EXPECTATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF CHARITY CARE PRO-
VIDED BY 340B HOSPITALS 1 (2014), http://340breform.org/userfiles/Final%20AIR%20340B%20
Charity%20Care%20Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/CNT9-KELN]; BIOTECH, supra note 5, at 6. 
140. Conti & Bach, supra note 83, at 1995.
141. In 2012, the American Hospital Association estimated that, nationally, registered
community hospitals dispensed $45.9 billion in uncompensated care—6.1 percent of total ex-
penses. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE COST FACT SHEET 3 (2014), http://
www.aha.org/content/14/14uncompensatedcare.pdf [http://perma.cc/H9DP-LXKZ]. Generally,
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that 340B was created to help safety-net providers “stretch scarce
federal resources as far as possible, reaching more eligible patients
and providing more comprehensive services.”142 
Reality depicts a picture different from those painted by both
manufacturers and the covered entities. It is generally true that
340B DSH hospitals provide more charity care and uncompensated
care as a proportion of total facility revenue.143 However, the GAO
has also identified that there are “notable numbers of 340B DSH
hospitals that provide[ ] low amounts of uncompensated care and
charity care.”144 Specifically, the GAO found that 14 percent of 340B
DSH hospitals “were among the hospitals that provided the lowest
amounts of uncompensated care across all hospitals” in its analy-
sis.145 This finding was coupled with the GAO’s conclusion that 340B
entities are generally incentivized under the program to prescribe
patients “more drugs, more expensive drugs, or both.”146 Conse-
quently, the GAO recommended that “Congress should consider
eliminating the incentive to prescribe more drugs or more expensive
drugs.”147
Lost in this discussion, however, are the patients themselves. If
the GAO’s analysis is to be believed, on the one hand, indigent pa-
tients148 benefit from the 340B program through additional services
and uncompensated care offered by 340B entities.149 On the other
uncompensated care refers to both “charity care” and “bad debt.” GAO 2015 REPORT, supra
note 31, at 5 n.16. The former category “represents services for which a hospital demonstrates
that a patient is unable to pay, and is based on a hospital’s policy to provide all or a portion
of services free of charge to patients who meet certain financial criteria.” Id. The latter desig-
nation “represents services for which a hospital determines that a patient has the financial
capacity to pay, but is unwilling to do so.” Id. 
142. SAFETY NET HOSPS., supra note 83, at 8 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102-384, pt. 2, at 12
(1994)). 
143. GAO 2015 REPORT, supra note 31, at 12. The GAO also reported that, “among 340B
DSH hospitals, the median amount of uncompensated care provided by major teaching
hospitals was less than the median amount provided by all hospitals in the group, despite the
fact that the major teaching hospitals in this group tended to have the highest DSH
adjustment percentages.” Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 14.
146. Id. at 20, 30.
147. Id. at 30.
148. Although the GAO’s analysis focused specifically on Medicare Part B beneficiaries,
there is no reason to suggest that the indigent patient populations generally would not fall
under a similar analysis.
149. Id. at 13.
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hand, however, indigent patients are harmed by higher medication
co-payments, higher insurance premiums, and physicians’ compro-
mised incentives to overprescribe medication.150 One has to assume
that, in the main, individual patients would not prefer a significant
increase in the cost of medication and insurance premiums151 even
if accompanied by an increase in the range of offered services. Yet,
to the patients at the margins, an increase in services could be
lifesaving, regardless of any increase in cost. The countervailing
interests of drug manufacturers and safety-net providers come to
practical terms at the level of the individual indigent patient. It is
the patients who are caught in the middle of the overarching debate
over the future of 340B.
In sum, policymakers are presented with a distinct challenge in
implementing the 340B program: how to balance competing inter-
ests and incentives to find a solution that benefits the parties who
most need 340B savings, namely safety-net providers and indigent
patients, without unnecessarily or excessively burdening drug man-
ufacturers. 
III. RETHINKING 340B: A FRAMEWORK
A. Proposed Solution
With consideration to the problems highlighted above, this Sec-
tion proposes a framework for revisions to 340B that may guide
policymakers seeking to improve the program. The proposal is laid
out in three parts: first, unlinking and separating 340B from
Medicaid; second, creating new eligibility standards for covered
entities and patients; and third, authorizing HHS with the proper
mandate to oversee and implement the new 340B effectively.
1. Separating 340B from Medicaid
Under the current regime, 340B overlaps significantly with
the MDRP, which creates opportunities for fraud and unneces-
sary redundancy. Although the two programs operate slightly
150. Id. at 29.
151. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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differently—340B provides entities an upfront discount, while the
MDRP operates with a post-sale rebate—covered entities are pro-
hibited under 340B from requesting a program discount if the drug
is “subject to the payment of a rebate to the State under [the
MDRP].”152 
Congress created the 340B scheme to be a patch that closes the
incentive loopholes created in the MDRP.153 Thus, in crafting 340B,
Congress specifically linked many of its definitions and calculations
to the Medicaid statute.154 This duplicative overlap, though perhaps
understandable from the legislative history, is unnecessary and
creates more problems than it solves. For example, the HHS Secre-
tary is tasked under 340B with establishing a mechanism to ensure
that 340B covered entities do not request duplicate discounts.155 In
previous years, this provision was enforced mostly via self-policing
by both sellers and buyers—a relatively costless, albeit eyebrow-
raising, enterprise.156 Since the 2011 GAO Report, and despite
HRSA’s adopted auditing procedures,157 the opportunity for dupli-
cate discount fraud is still viable, and the cost of auditing will only
increase in the future as the number of covered entities continues
to rise. If Congress removes the overlap between the two programs,
however, the opportunity for fraud would be mitigated and auditing
costs could theoretically be reduced.
The basic thrust of this change would be to supplement the pro-
gram with a second eligibility trigger for 340B participation. First,
healthcare providers would have to qualify as covered entities.158
Second, covered entities would have to certify that the recipients of
152. 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(5)(A) (2012) (“Prohibiting duplicate discounts or rebates.”).
153. See, e.g., Public Health Clinic Prudent Pharmaceutical Purchasing Act: Hearing Be-
fore the S. Comm. of Labor & Human Res., 102d Cong. 54 (1991) (statement of Gerald J.
Mossingoff, President, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) (“We understand that the
introduction of the bill is a reaction to the price increases to the covered entities caused by the
best-price provisions of the Medicaid Rebate Program. That could be addressed by adopting
the same approach that is contained in the Department of Veterans Affairs Appropriation Act;
namely, to exempt the prices to the covered entities from the Medicaid rebate best price
calculations.”).
154. See, e.g., supra note 31.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(5)(A)(ii).
156. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
157. See supra notes 51-53; see also HRSA AUDIT REPORTS, http://www.hrsa.gov/opa/
programintegrity/auditresults/ [http://perma.cc/S2DR-VU57]. 
158. See supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
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the drugs are qualifying patients: in other words, those who meet
HRSA’s definition of “patient” and are not covered by Medicaid.
Thus, patients would be either eligible or ineligible for 340B drugs
based on their insurance coverage, rather than being automatically
qualified based on the status of their care provider.
There are three primary provisions that should be addressed if
340B is to be separated from Medicaid.159 First, the double covered
provision should be revised. Any given patient of a covered entity
should only be covered by one drug discount or rebate.160 Although
covered entities currently may claim either a 340B discount or a
Medicaid rebate,161 the fact that 340B and the MDRP cover some of
the same patients—those covered by Medicaid—is duplicative.
Instead, the MDRP should apply only to Medicaid patients, and
340B should only apply to non-Medicaid patients. Eliminating this
unnecessary redundancy will reduce 340B’s administration expens-
es by removing the opportunity for covered entities to request
double discounts. Additionally, this revision could reverse 340B’s
current trend of expanding concurrently with Medicaid. If 340B
covers only those not covered by Medicaid—namely, patients that
are uninsured, privately insured, or on Medicare—340B’s extrane-
ous growth may halt and begin to decline as Medicaid eligibility
expands post-ACA.162
Second, the eligibility trigger incentivizing manufacturers to opt
in to 340B163 should remain untouched. Under the current regime,
manufacturers must sign 340B PPAs with HHS to be eligible for any
159. This proposal does not address the multiple linked definitions between the Medicaid
statute and 340B. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(1) (definition of “average manufacturer price”);
id. § 256b(a)(2)(B) (definition of “over the counter drug”); id. § 256b(a)(4)(A) (definition of
“federally-qualified health center”). These definitions are used more for ease of use, however,
than they are used to actually link the two programs together, and so are not of major
concern.
160. The distinction between Medicaid drugs and 340B drugs already exists as the former
are specifically exempted from the 340B scheme. See id. § 256b(a)(1), (3). It makes sense to
tether the patients receiving the drugs to the drugs themselves so that hospitals do not have
to decide whether to claim the MDRP rebate or the 340B discount.
161. See id. § 256b(a)(5)(A)(i).
162. This may be an overly rosy outlook. If, however, illegitimate profit incentives are
removed from the program as well, hospitals will no longer be incentivized to continue
expanding their patient bases to collect 340B profits.
163. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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state Medicaid funding.164 This condition resulted from manu-
facturers raising drug prices for certain entities—especially the
VA—in the immediate aftermath of the passage of the MDRP.165
Without this condition, there are few other incentives for manufac-
turers to offer 340B-type discounts, especially considering that man-
ufacturers must pay out rebates under the MDRP. Thus, very few
manufacturers would opt in to the 340B program, and its intended
beneficiaries would be left without aid.
In light of the first proposed revision, to remove Medicaid patients
from 340B, it may seem odd to leave Medicaid funding as the mech-
anism by which to incentivize manufacturers to opt in to the 340B
program. This mechanism, however, is merely an incentive scheme.
Once manufacturers opt in to 340B, the Medicaid condition would
no longer affect the program.166
The third implicated provision is that of the eligibility standard
for hospitals: the disproportionate share adjustment percentage
(DSAP).167 The DSAP for a hospital is dependent upon a statutory
formula for the “disproportionate patient percentage,” calculated as
“the sum of the percentage of Medicare inpatient days attributable
to patients eligible for both Medicare Part A and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), and the percentage of total inpatient days
attributable to patients eligible for Medicaid but not Medicare Part
A.”168 Thus, a hospital’s eligibility for 340B is based in part on the
total assistance the hospital dispenses to patients eligible for Medi-
caid.169 If Medicaid is uncoupled from 340B, and Medicaid patients
are not eligible for 340B discounts (and vice versa) it would seem
strange to maintain a 340B eligibility requirement for hospitals
based partly on Medicaid patients who would not be eligible for
340B discounts themselves.170
164. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
165. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-384 (I), at 2-4 (1991); supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
166. There is no preference for the Medicaid funding incentive as opposed to any other
incentive, except for the fact that it is currently operable. There seems to be no reason to
disturb this existing incentive mechanism unless a much better one exists.
167. Calculated under 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(F). See supra note 40.
168. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Disproportionate Share Hospital, CMS.GOV,
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/dsh.html
[http://perma.cc/MCQ4-H5ZF] (last modified Oct. 26, 2015). 
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(II). 
170. The other categories of covered entities under 340B would not be affected by any
changes to this provision, as the DSAP calculation does not play a role in their eligibility
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There are reasons for and against including Medicaid-eligible
individuals in the 340B eligibility trigger. First, DSAP calculation
is only partially, not wholly, determined by a hospital’s percentage
of patients eligible for Medicaid.171 Second, the percentage of pa-
tients eligible for Medicaid is a simple and efficient measurement
to determine how much care a hospital dispenses to low-income
patients—insured or not. On the other hand, tying 340B hospital
eligibility to Medicaid will cause 340B to continue to grow with the
expansion of Medicaid: not necessarily a significant negative con-
cern, but one that should perhaps give pause in a world of rapidly
growing healthcare costs.172 
Alternatively, Congress could create a DSAP formula that would
rely on the Medicare patient percentage used in the original formu-
la, and the percentage of the hospital’s patients that are uninsured
and have incomes below 400 percent of the federal poverty level.
This formula would achieve the same purpose of identifying safety-
net hospitals, but would not rely on the traditional DSAP formula
involving Medicaid patients.173
2. Creating New Eligibility Standards and Requirements for
Covered Entities
a. Patient Eligibility
Section 340B patients should be separated into three different
categories: indigent, privately insured, and Medicare patients. First,
indigent patients would be defined by insurance and income criteria,
specifically targeting patients uninsured through any means, and
who are unable to pay for any necessary outpatient medication out
criterion. See id. § 256b(a)(4).
171. See id. § 1395ww(d)(5)(F) (statutory formula).
172. For example, a hospital whose low-income patients are all eligible for Medicaid would
qualify for 340B discounts, but would not be eligible to actually collect 340B discounts because
Medicaid patients themselves would not be eligible for 340B. However, non-Medicaid patients
on Medicare would still be eligible for 340B discounts from the hospital.
173. Consequently, as Medicaid eligibility continues to expand in the wake of the ACA,
the number of DSH hospitals under 340B would contract. However, under this definition of
DSAP, a hospital that treats a very small number of uninsured, low-income patients would
not qualify for 340B discounts, defeating the purpose of 340B. This fact speaks more in favor
of leaving 340B’s hospital eligibility criterion tied to Medicaid patient percentage.
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of pocket. Second, privately insured patients would be those who are
insured through some means other than Medicaid or Medicare, or
who have enough income to pay for medication out of pocket.174
Third, Medicare patients would be those who are eligible for Medi-
care benefits, are not covered by Medicaid,175 and are otherwise
eligible to receive 340B discounts.
The current definition of “patient” and the guidance offered by
HRSA176 would be nearly sufficient when paired with the income
and insurance requirements of the new plan. That said, HRSA
should still clarify a few of the ambiguous provisions in its current
guidance.
Each patient category would be linked to a different sized dis-
count from the manufacturer, depending on the relative ability of
the patient to pay. Indigent patients would receive the largest dis-
count (for example, 50 to 80 percent of AMP). Privately insured
patients would receive a discount similar to the current 340B
standards (for example, 20 to 50 percent of AMP). Medicare patients
would also receive discounts similar to the current program. The
purpose of delineating patient groups in this way is to more specif-
ically match an appropriate discount to the relative ability of each
patient group to purchase medication, thereby tailoring the program
more neatly to each patient’s needs.
b. Requirements for Covered Entities
Currently, covered entities are not required to pass on any 340B
discounts to the patient.177 For example, Entity A may purchase a
drug from the manufacturer at a 23.1 percent discount—the mini-
mum discount for brand-name drugs—and resell the drug to the
patient at full price (AMP), thereby keeping the difference. Under
the new program, however, covered entities would be required to
pass on at least some of the discount so that both covered entities
and patients could share in the benefit.
174. To be considered “privately insured” likely would require income of higher than 400
percent of the poverty level. 
175. Patients covered by both Medicaid and Medicare would be covered under the Medicaid
Drug Rebate Program. 
176. See supra Part II.A.1. 
177. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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Entities would be required to pass on different percentages of
340B discounts, conditioned on the category of patient who pur-
chased the underlying drugs.178 For indigent patients, the covered
entity would be required to pass on a high percentage of the
discount (for example, 60 to 100 percent). For privately insured pa-
tients, entities could pass on as much or as little of the discount as
they would like. For Medicare patients, entities would be required
to pass on a small percentage of the discount (for example, 20 to 40
percent). 
There are a few reasons for creating such a sliding scale to pass
on 340B discounts. First, it would require entities to share discounts
with patients, reducing the significant cost burdens of outpatient
medication for the most vulnerable populations. Second, it would
give covered entities some degree of discretion in passing on dis-
counts, creating competition in the pharmaceutical provider market
between multiple 340B entities in a given area. Third, it would
allow entities to collect savings (or profits) only from those patient
populations that can afford to pay a higher percentage of AMP. In
short, this sliding scale approach would balance between helping
safety-net providers and indigent populations. 
3. Authorizing HHS with the Proper Mandate
In addition to unlinking 340B from Medicaid and revising the
eligibility standards and entity requirements, the new 340B pro-
gram should include the requisite authority for HHS to administer
the program as needed. Under the current program, HHS cannot
issue legislative rules to solve conflicting schemes like the orphan
drug exemption.179 Although Congress should not grant unlimited
authority to run 340B, HHS must have more leeway than it has
under its current grant of power.
178. The percentages suggested in this section are certainly not final—they are merely
suggestions. 
179. Giving HHS the proper mandate would resolve the debate over the orphan drug
exception. See supra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
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B. Potential Outcomes
1. Potential Benefits
This proposal attempts to balance 340B’s competing interests
and incentives and place the program in a position where it can
more effectively serve all parties involved. 
Manufacturers would likely be as strongly incentivized as they
were under the original program to opt in to 340B due to the
Medicaid funds condition. Manufacturers, however, would not be
required under the new plan to offer discounts under 340B for
Medicaid patients, saving manufacturers costs that they would
otherwise incur. As Medicaid expands, the number of patients
eligible for 340B discounts would decrease, setting a limit on the
total number of discounts manufacturers would be required to dis-
pense. This trend could significantly benefit manufacturers in the
long run.
Covered entities likely would also benefit from this plan. 340B
hospitals and clinics would be required under the new plan to pass
on discounts to the poorest of their patients, but would be allowed
to keep a percentage of the savings for patients who could afford to
pay a higher price for medication. The larger discounts given to indi-
gent patients would allow entities to offer safety-net services at a
lower cost, while the savings the entities could collect from privately
insured patients would allow covered entities to offer a wider range
of safety-net services, keeping with the intent of the original 340B
program.
Patients would likely benefit from the new 340B because they
could collect currently unseen discounts from the manufacturer
through the covered entity. Additionally, the discretion covered
entities would have as to the exact percentage of the discounts to
pass on could create competition between entities, and the marginal
patient could shop for the best price.
2. Potential Critiques
No legislation is perfect, however, and the new 340B plan does
have a downside. The administrative cost of implementing the pro-
gram would likely be substantially the same as, or perhaps even
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greater than it is currently. HRSA likely would still have to audit
covered entities to ensure they would not divert 340B drugs in-
tended for one patient group to another. As the middleman retailers,
covered entities would still be required to track 340B drugs through
their pipelines to ensure that the appropriately discounted drugs
reached the correct recipients. Additionally, hospitals would have
to create a new system for categorizing patients based upon the new
criteria. The information necessary for that process, however, is
information hospitals already collect,180 so presumably the added
administrative cost would not be overly burdensome. 
An appropriate cost-benefit analysis of the proposed revision to
340B cannot be determined until actual data can be obtained and
evaluated. Theoretically, however, this proposal’s benefits out-
weigh its administrative costs, especially over the long term, as
HHS would have the authority to update 340B as necessary to make
it more efficient.
CONCLUSION
In light of its history, rapidly expanding size and scope, and
immediate and fundamental internal problems, the 340B drug
pricing program needs revision to better serve all the parties in-
volved. Currently, competing incentives between manufacturers and
covered entities in a highly profitable marketplace drive the 340B
discussion. To truly serve the indigent populations covered by the
safety-net providers, however, Congress needs to rethink 340B
and balance the program more appropriately. 
First, Congress should untether 340B from the Medicaid drug re-
bate program, allowing 340B to target only the specific populations
within its scope and thus more appropriately serve its intended ben-
eficiaries. Second, Congress should recognize the inherent differ-
ences among the patient populations currently served by 340B and
tailor drug discounts to match each group’s ability to pay. Third,
Congress needs to authorize HHS with the appropriate mandate to
administer the 340B program effectively. 
180. The new patient groups would be pegged primarily to types of insurance coverage.
Healthcare providers already collect insurance data.
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The proposal above is a practical framework for a fresh perspec-
tive on the 340B program. Moreover, it provides a foundation for
future discussion, identifying key issues and possible solutions to
the 340B scheme. Moving forward, Congress and HHS should
conduct research and cost-benefit analyses on each provision of the
current program and any proposed revisions to ensure that imple-
mented changes help the program take strides in the appropriate
direction. Considering the size, scope, and purpose of 340B, both
indigent patients and safety-net hospitals could derive significant
benefits from a properly functioning and appropriately targeted
drug discount program. To that end, Congress should rethink
340B’s implementation and seek to revise the program to become
one that appropriately balances the interests of manufacturers and
covered entities, and provides much-needed discounted drugs to
the indigent.
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